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ABSTRACT

While large companies continue to thrive on pervasive technological advancements,
small inventors have been limited by their inability to exploit their patents. Patent
portfolio licensing created a pioneering way to increase the utility of patents;
however, in practice this business model has typically favored powerful players in the
technology industry. A new market has emerged based on innovative business
models which favor small inventors. This market seeks to aggregate and distribute
patents to companies that infringe on intellectual property or that want to draw on it
as a source. By matching patent owners with patent users, this market may enable
small inventors to have a greater stake in their technological efforts.
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LEVELING THE PATENT PLAYING FIELD
PETER N. DETKIN*

INTRODUCTION

In the United States, as in most technologically advanced nations, patent
licensing occurs within a system that is imbalanced in favor of the biggest players.1
Small companies and individuals have few good options for licensing their patents or
developing their inventions without interference from infringers. 2 In recent years,
media headlines have drawn attention to the attempts of some of these smaller
entrants-some unscrupulous, some not-to seek payment for their patented ideas
through threatened or actual litigation. The number of articles decrying a rise in
patent lawsuits and an alleged boom in "patent trolls" has skyrocketed since 2001,
when I first coined that term. 3 Much less scrutiny, however, has been given to the
overwhelming barriers that small inventors currently face in negotiating licensing
deals, a situation that often leaves litigation as their only practical option.
A twenty-year career in the intellectual property field has allowed me to observe
the structural problems with patent markets-and the ways they are exploitedfrom a wide range of perspectives. I have counseled inventors, entrepreneurs, and
large corporations, and have represented clients who in some cases were aggrieved
patent holders and in others were accused infringers. Within the past several years,
as new business models for intellectual property have emerged in response to the
failures in our patent system, the focus of my work has shifted to these novel
strategies.
These market-based solutions offer great promise to solve some of those systemic
failures, and so present a complement-and in certain cases an alternative-to the
legislative reform that the Congress has been deliberating. 4 Many of the patent law
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ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 15 (Princeton University

Press 2004).
2

Id.

3 See, e.g., Zachary Roth, Patent Troll Menace, WASH. MONTHLY, June 2005, at 12 (asserting
that patent trolls have caused great concern in the intellectual property community); Brenda
Sandburg, Trolling for Dollars: Patent Enforcers Are Searing Corporate America, and They're
Getting Rich-Very Rich-Doing It, THE RECORDER, July 30, 2001 at 1 (explaining how the author
coined the term "patent troll").
4 John R. Thomas & Wendy H. Schacht, Patent Reform in the 110th Congress: Innovation
Issues, CRS REP. FOR CONG., May 7, 2007, at 2, available at http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/
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reforms under consideration would tilt an already unbalanced playing field to further
benefit large corporations in the information technology industries. 5 Certainly parts
of the existing patent law can be improved. 6 However, to arrive at a truly robust
solution-not to mention a more just and enlightened one-tweaking the rules is not
enough; we need to change the nature of the game altogether.
One such game-changing event is the emergence of new players in the patent
licensing arena. Some of the new entrants are patent aggregators, who can offer
small inventors better access to important commercial partners and can also enhance
their bargaining power. Others are patent market makers that aim to reduce the
time and expense of licensing transactions. Still others are investors who use an
increasingly sophisticated set of financing tools to provide patent holders with
resources on a par with alleged infringers.
These new players are deploying an ever-widening range of patent
commercialization strategies to help level the playing field. They can marshal
capital, expertise, connections, and economies of scale to knock down the barriers
that have thwarted small inventors and offer alternatives to litigation, with all its
expenses, delays, and uncertainties. Aggregators, distributors, and other new kinds
of players will be key ingredients in the long-term construction of a rational and fully
functional market for patent licenses. Much as venture capital and private equity
matured into profitable business models, this new crop of pioneers-call them
invention capitalists-will, with encouragement, find creative solutions that bring
liquidity and stability to the IP industry.

I. NAVIGATING THE MAZE: SMALL INVENTOR REALITIES
It is not widely appreciated that a large fraction of important inventions in this
country come from inventors working alone or in small companies or universities,
rather than from big companies with huge research and development budgets.
Indeed, during the 1990s forty-three percent of all patent applications filed in the
U.S. by American inventors originated from small entities: individuals, small
businesses, and non-profit organizations. 7 Upon reflection, this fact should not be
surprising. There are many more scientists and engineers in academia and in small
companies than there are in big corporations. In addition, most corporate R&D
focuses on developing incremental improvements to existing products, rather than on
inventing new products altogether.
It is also not widely appreciated just how difficult it is for these small-scale
inventors to navigate the bewildering maze of obstacles that stand between the act of

RL33996 20070507.pdf (giving an overview of the current patent reform issues being deliberated by
Congress). See also Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
5F. Scott Kieff, A Keiretsu App-roach to Patents, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Feb./Mar. 2001, at 51
(discussing the mechanism behind this effect).
(3See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 171 (detailing current problems and suggesting
myriad reforms for the U.S. patent system).
7 E-mail from Jim Hirabayashi and Paul Harrison, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patent
Technology Monitoring Division (Feb. 2, 2005).
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invention and its successful monetization (see figure for a somewhat simplified view
of two trajectories through this maze). 8 A patent typically takes two to three years
from the date of filing to finally issue. 9 With a newly minted patent in hand, an
inventor sets out to find a big manufacturer to produce the invention or investors to
bankroll his own business venture.1 0 That is when the real difficulties begin.

The Patent Licensing Maze
Small inventors face numerous obstacles asthey try to realize the full potential of their ideas, whether the patent holders are
simply trying to sell their
tehnology to companies (case
1,left column) or want to halt infdngement (case
2,right column).
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S See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 27 (detailing the process required to obtain a patent
under the current system).
9 See
United States Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO-General
Questions,
http://www.uspto.gov/main/faq/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
10 See generally, Vito J. DeBari, Note, Internationalizationof Patent Law: A Proposed
Solution to the United States' First to File Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 687, 711 (1993)
(discussing the argument that small inventors are hurt by the first to file system because they need
additional time to attract investors). See also, Matthew P. Donohue, Note, First to File vs. First to
Invent: Will UniversitiesBe Left Behind 21 J.C. & U.L. 765, 776 (1995) (stating that adversaries of
"first to file" rule claim that it benefits corporations).
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Consider the example of Dr. James Cunningham, a veteran chemical and
electrical engineer who began his career at Texas Instruments in 1961.11 Over the
years, Cunningham accumulated 46 patents as an employee at six semiconductor
companies and as a consultant to many more. Many of his inventions boosted the
speed of computer microprocessors by working around limitations of the metals used
to make circuit paths inside the microchips. In the 1990s, Cunningham came up
with several ideas that made it easier for microprocessor companies to switch from
aluminum circuitry to copper, which resulted in tremendous improvements in
processor performance. Five of these copper-related ideas received patents.
Dr. Cunningham showed his patents to six major microchip companies and a
semiconductor equipment company in the expectation that they would negotiate a
fair license to use his inventions. In a perfect world Dr. Cunningham would be
compensated for his time, talent, and investment; the manufacturers would get a
technology to advance their business; and the public would get better computers. It
should be a win-win-win situation. Unfortunately, that is not how the system works.
The licensing operations of big corporations are quite inscrutable to outsiders.
Inventors often find it very difficult just to determine who in the company is the right
person to speak to about a license. That was the case for Dr. Cunningham, even
though he had worked in the field for decades.
From an inside perspective, corporate license negotiators are typically busy
people, and some licensing staff tend to regard solitary inventors as crackpots or
trolls until proven otherwise. Corporate employees are driven primarily by their
perceived duty to limit the licensing fees they pay, not by a company's obligation to
pay for intellectual property of others that it uses. They accomplish this goal by
deploying a number of tactics to whittle down an inventor's patience and his price.
Initial contact, for example, is usually followed by a seemingly interminable round of
telephone tag. One of my colleagues boasts that his first negotiating ploy is to avoid
any meeting for at least two months-and then to reschedule it at the last minute.
That first meeting, when it finally occurs, is typically a prelude to anywhere
from six to eighteen months of discussion and argument. Discussions about prior art
can chew up months of meetings, as can debates about how the invention might find
use in the marketplace.
Manufacturers will often dispute the validity and
enforceability of the patents. Even if they are already using the patented technology,
they will rarely acknowledge that fact, thereby forcing the inventor to reverseengineer the product in question (often at considerable expense) to answer some basic
questions.
Large companies can also, of course, devote far greater resources to these
discussions than any small inventor such as Dr. Cunningham can muster. Corporate
lawyers can easily assemble market research that the inventor must dig deep to find,
for example. And they have access to engineers who can help them understand the
workings of the prior art and any infringing products (the better to obfuscate the
infringement). The inventor, in contrast, must rely almost exclusively on his own
research from the outside looking in.

11As discussed further infra, Dr. Cunningham has a relationship with Intellectual Ventures,
the author's company.
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After dragging out the process, the company often simply declines to license the
patent under any reasonable terms. Five of the seven manufacturers that Dr.
Cunningham approached turned him down.
When negotiations break down, an inventor is left frustrated and, at least until
recently, with few options other than engaging a law firm to haul any infringer into
court. 12 The media frenzy surrounding a few high-payout patent suits, such as NTP's
$612.5 million settlement from Research in Motion in 2006, along with intense
lobbying efforts by a few large companies, could give the impression that little guys
often win at high stakes litigation.1 3 In fact, they hardly ever do.
Big players have a distinct advantage in a lawsuit because they can afford the
multimillion-dollar legal fees and the lengthy delays, which typically run three to
seven years for patent suits that reach a judgment on the merits. Even worse than
the interminable delays, most inventors are loathe to sue because it distracts them
from what they truly love-inventing! For these reasons, Dr. Cunningham elected
not to turn to the courts for justice.
He should have been paid fairly, and fairly quickly, for his invention so that he
could turn his attention to inventing the next great thing. That is what our system is
supposed to encourage. 14 Yet under our current system, that rarely happens.

II.

PORTFOLIO LICENSING-A BOUNTIFUL OPPORTUNITY... IF YOU'RE

IBM

Although patent litigation gets all the ink, the market opportunity is actually
much larger for patent licensing, which happens every day. There are a few proven
models in technology patent licensing. 15 Unfortunately for Dr. Cunningham and
other small inventors of the world, there is no place for them in any of these models.
The first proven model is exemplified by the extensive licensing operations of
giant companies with large, broad portfolios, such as IBM, Lucent, and Thomson.
These corporations exploit their prodigious capital and market presence to execute
licensing programs that extract hundreds of millions in revenue from hundreds to
thousands of licensees. 16 In a few cases, the licensing effort is actually the most
profitable part of the company. 17

12 See generally ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 163-64 (Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2006) (discussing the different types of
patent litigation).
13Will Rodger & Matt Schruers, RIM Settlement Shows Patent System Broken, CCIA Says,
COMPUTER & COMMC'N INDUS. ASS'N, Mar. 6, 2006, http://www.ccianet.org/artmanager/publish/
2006/RIMSettlementShowsPatentSystemBrokenCCIASays.shtml (last visited Sept. 8, 2007).
1'See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 7 (asserting that "governments have long recognized
the broad social value generated by new technologies, and hence have sought to reward inventors of
important technologies").
15R. Polk Wagner & Gideon Parchomovsky, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 31 (2005)
(discussing different ways a patent portfolio may be leveraged, including different licensing
arrangements).
1c See, JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 14 (explaining that many large companies have
begun licensing their technologies for higher profits and Texas Instruments netted close to $1 billion
annually from patent licenses and settlements).
17

See id.
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A second successful model has been demonstrated by companies that have
narrow but deep portfolios, such as Qualcomm (cellular telephony), Rambus (memory
chip designs), and Texas Instruments (semiconductor technology). 18 Here, too, wellcapitalized licensing programs tap hundreds of licensees for IP revenues in the
millions of dollars. 19
The third well-established model is the corporate patent pool: a collection of
patents drawn from a group of big companies, usually in support of a technology
standard, such as MPEG video or DVDs. These pools are dominated by the founders'
patents and are backed with ample cash to enforce licensing. 20 Members of the pool
generally cross-license each other's patents in deals that reflect the relative strength
and impact of each company's overall portfolio. 21 Small-scale inventors are typically
shut out of these pools. 22 The result iseffectively a kind of IP cartel that, holding
23
hundreds or thousands of valuable patents, can turn market dynamics in its favor.
Academic studies have come to the same conclusion that experience in the real
world shows: the access and negotiating strength of a large portfolio provides a
powerful market advantage. 24 Although somewhere between one third and one half
of all issued patents originated with small inventors, few manufacturers can claim
that they pay a third or more of their license fees to small entities. The vast majority
of licensing revenues are collected by large firms.
Even a small inventor as prolific as Dr. Cunningham has far too few patents to
set up a portfolio licensing operation using these conventional models. Nor does he
have the credibility of established technology companies or the market clout of patent
pools. Little wonder, then, that having been rebuffed in good-faith negotiation
attempts, shut out of the portfolio game, and frustrated by often blatant poaching of
their supposedly protected ideas, some patent holders see no choice but to swing for
the fences in a high-stakes lawsuit. Those who follow this route are often derided as
"patent trolls" and lumped in with less scrupulous patent holders that use serial
25
lawsuits to extract nuisance-value settlements.
18About Qualcomm: Enabling the Wireless Industry, http://www.qualcomm.com/about/
index.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2007) (noting that Qualcomm currently has over 6,000 patents and
patent applications in CDMA (code division multiple access) and other related cellular technologies);
Press Release, Rambus, Inc., Rambus Achieves 500th Patent Milestone (June 1, 2006),
http://www.rambus.com/us/news/press releases/2006/060601.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2007)
('Rambus' growing patent portfolio includes fundamental inventions in the area of memory design,
high-speed interfaces, package layout, and system design."); Texas Instruments: TI Fact Sheet,
http://www.ti.com/corp/docs/company/factsheet.shtml (last visited Aug. 30, 2007) (displaying that
semiconductors accounted for $13.7 billion out of a total of $14.3 billion in revenue in 2006).
19See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 14.
20 Steven C. Carlson, Note, PatentPools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359,
368 (1999).
21 See also id. ("Pools can also be formed in advance of litigation to preclude likely suits and to
promote the rapid development of technology.").
22 No individual inventors, for example, participate in the large pool that enforces patent rights
to the MPEG video compression technologies.
23 See Carlson, supra note 20 at 372 (stating that the approval from the Department of Justice
to allow the MPEG patent pool validated "a collectively enforced monopoly over a fundamental
communications standard").
24 See Wagner & Parchomovsky, supra note 15.
25 Raymond P. Niro, Who is Really Undermining the Patent Systom-'Patent Trolls" or
Congress , 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 185 (2007). While Mr. Niro's article is otherwise

[6:636 2007]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

While I coined the term "patent troll," I refrain from using it today. It has
become too emotionally charged and too often hurled carelessly as an epithet to
disparage just about every kind of plaintiff in a patent suit. 26 In place of namecalling and contentious debate over the symptoms of imbalances in the market for
patents, we need to address their underlying cause.

III. NEW BUSINESS MODELS
Emerging models of patent monetization will help the patent system to regain
its balance. These new business models are being pioneered primarily by startups
that are not product companies (at least not yet) and that share several other
characteristics as well. They recognize the value of the intellectual property held by
small inventors. They are keenly aware of the inefficiencies endemic in the
traditional markets for licenses to such patents. And they have developed the ability
to garner enough resources to work productively with corporations that either
infringe small inventors' intellectual property or want to draw on it as a source for
innovation. 27
The past five years have seen a wide range of approaches to patent aggregation
and distribution that promise to rectify many of the inefficiencies of the patent
licensing market. ThinkFire, ipValue Management, and other licensing houses were
among the first such firms founded. 28 These consultants principally work with large
companies to help them evaluate and exploit their IP assets. 29 Their corporate
clients typically have a healthy patent portfolio built up over the course of many
years, but simply do not have the in-house expertise or resources to exploit this
30°
valuable resource.
Ocean Tomo, launched in 2003, has established itself as a primary organizer of
patent auctions. Although the auction approach got off to a slow start, Ocean Tomo
now hosts four auctions each year. Its auction this past April saw the sale of some

replete with colorful descriptions of the case underlying the derivation of the "troll" phrase, he
curiously omits an important fact-all of his claims were tossed on summary judgment, a ruling
upheld on appeal. See TechSearch, LLC v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1363, 1381 (2002) (concluding
that the district court properly granted Intel's motion for summary judgment of non-infringement
and affirming that finding), cert. denied,537 U.S. 995 (2002).
26

Jennifer Kahaulelio Gregory, The Troll Next Door, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.

292, 292-93 (2007).
27 James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function
of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189 (2007).
28 See Eric W. Pfeiffer, Mine Games, FORBES.COM, June 24, 2002, http://members.forbes.com/
asap/2002/0624/060.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2007) (stating that two new startups, ipValue and
ThinkFire, created a new industry focused on assisting other corporations to manage the value of
their patents). See also ipValue Management, Inc. Overview, http://www.ipvalue.com/
company/index.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2007) (stating that ipValue was founded in October 2001
to assist companies in achieving the greatest value from their IP portfolios).
29 See, e.g., ipValue Management Inc. Overview, http://www.ipvalue.com/company/index.html
(last visited Aug. 30, 2007) ("To date, ipVALUE has delivered over $250M in transactions on behalf
of its partners and has facilitated numerous strategic cross-licensing deals.").
30 See Peter Spours, How to Exploit Patents for Profit,IPREVIEW, Spring 2006, at 26.
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180 patents for more than $11 million. 31 These patents came from individual
inventors, universities, and large companies such as lomega. 32 Ocean Tomo also has
developed a stock index fund (AmEx: OTP) designed to track the patent strength of
300 constituent companies. 33 Investors in the fund thus essentially invest in
companies based on the value of their intellectual property assets. 34 Over the longer
term, Ocean Tomo is working with others to create a centralized IP exchange in
Chicago, called the IPX, at which patents can be assigned values and traded in much
the same way that other securities are today. 35 Current plans call for the IPX to
begin trading in 2010.36

Acacia Research and Mosaid, both publicly traded corporations, represent a
third approach. They have been purchasing patents and small portfolios, and then
asserting them individually, rather than as part of a very broad portfolio. Acacia, for
37
example, was by mid-2007 running more than two dozen licensing programs.
Privately owned firms, such as Rembrandt IP and Altitude Capital, have been
investing in companies that own compelling intellectual property assets but need
financing for later-stage development or for litigation. 38 These players take on a role
analogous to that of private equity firms by providing "staying power" for businesses
39
during litigation or licensing programs.
40
Intellectual Ventures, the company I co-founded, is taking yet another tack.
We are assembling portfolios of patents, some of which we purchase from small
inventors and large companies, and some of which we file on our own inventions. We
couple the portfolios with careful analysis and research to create a rational licensing
model for managing invention rights in markets where products rely on multiple
technologies from multiple sources.
A firm such as ours can promote inventions in several ways. First, we present
corporate license negotiators with a carefully pre-screened set of patents. Because the
negotiators know that the patents are legitimate and relevant to their operations, the
parties can come to terms much more quickly. Second, we have greater expertise in
license negotiation and patent defense than do most inventors. Overall, we bring to
31Sandra Upson, Live PatentAuctions Tantalize Inventors, IEEE SPECTRUM, June 11, 2007,
http://www. spectrum. ieee.org/jun07/5173 (last visited Sept. 8, 2007).
32Id.

3 See Bennett Voyles, A New Way to Tap into the Next Big Idea, ON WALL STREET, Feb. 1,
2007, http://www.onwallstreet.com/article.cfm?articleid=3513 (last visited Sept. 8, 2007).
"3 See id.

3 See IPXChicago, http://www.ipxchicago.com (last visited Aug. 30, 2007).
36 See id.
37 Press Release, Acacia Research Corp., Acacia Technologies Purchase 3 Patent Portfolios with
36 Patents Relating to Flash Memory, Computer Graphics and Dram from Alliance Semiconductor
(June 29, 2007), http://www.acaciaresearch.com/pr/062907FlashMemory.pdf (last visited Sept. 8,
2007).
38 John R. Allison et al, Software Patents, Incumbents and Entry, 85 TEXAS L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=989592 (last visited Sept. 8, 2007).
'39See IAM Blog, http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=affO8af3d-lb414763b9e3
c4e1851bb270 (Feb. 9, 2007) (last visited Sept. 8, 2007).
40See generally Intellectual Ventures, http://www.intellectualventures.com/ (last visited Aug.
30, 2007) ("Through acquisitions and partnering, we can create more comprehensive portfolios of
inventions. A broader portfolio benefits potential clients by providing more inventions from a single
source, and it benefits inventors by giving them a greater chance of commercial success by being
part of a more comprehensive offering.").
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the table a unique mixture of technical and business skills; most players in patent
negotiations are more specialized and do not have this broad range of skills available.
Finally, the work we do frees inventors from wasting their time at a task for which
they are typically unenthusiastic and poorly suited.
Dr. Cunningham, for example, sold his suite of semiconductor patents to
Intellectual Ventures in exchange for a lump sum payment in a transaction that took
far less time than a typical licensing negotiation. Having received a fair return on
his ideas, he can now get back to what he enjoys, while we enhance the value of his
inventions by bundling them with others into a package that is much more attractive
to microchip producers than his patents would be on their own.
This approach improves market efficiency not only for the inventor, but also for
the manufacturer, in much the same way that real estate brokers do. If you want to
build a skyscraper on a city block that is currently covered with multiunit flats, you
could hold hundreds of negotiations to buy out the owners of the existing condos and
apartments, or you could negotiate one lease with a veteran real estate developer
who will deal, in turn, with those owners. The latter is far more efficient.
Newly conceived technologies and the patents that protect them are, needless to
say, quite a bit more complex and diverse than are deeds to real estate. So those who
would serve as brokers in this area must assemble a set of knowledge that is richer in
some ways and more integrated than that of even the largest manufacturing
conglomerates.
Each of the new business models described above plays a role in matching
patent owners with patent users, allowing inventors and their business partners to
be fairly compensated for their invention, providing companies with an efficient
means to license or purchase inventions they are using at a fair price, and improving
the speed and breadth of the public's access to new products and services-all while
ensuring that bad patents do not receive unreasonable compensation or otherwise
gum up the works.
No doubt this new market will face many challenges as it emerges. But we
should encourage pioneers and policymakers to create solutions that restore balance
to the patent playing field. In a fair game, some will win and some will lose-but
more will play, and all of society will be the richer because of it.

